All or nothing?
This entry was posted on 8/1/2006 1:42 AM and is filed under uncategorized.
John Podhoretz has
reassured an anxious public that he's against genocide. I still think one part of this dance (ask whether genocide is an effective tactic Sunday, express horror that anyone thought you were really, you know,
asking on Monday) is an effort to advocate, without really saying so, harsher tactics by western militaries against their Islamist opponents. But I do take Podhoretz at his word when he writes:
The point of the column was that there are measures entirely
closed off to us because of the nature of our civilization and that
this puts us at a unique disadvantage when fighting a stateless foe of
unique ruthlessness. I am not upset — far from it — that they are
closed off to us. That's why I described our humanitarian focus as the
highest achievement of civilization. But it is preposterous not to understand, when you fight by Marquis of
Queensbury rules and your opponent feels free to kick you in the groin
and shoot your dog, that your more civilized approach might represent a
form of self-shackling when your aim is victory at all costs.
My problem with this more nuanced position is that I think it gives western societies both too little and too much credit. I don't for a second think that the United States plays by Marquis of Queensbury rules when its aim is victory at all costs. We have a long track record over several centuries of dealing ruthlessly with threats, not just to our lives, but to our interests. I don't think that's changed as much in the past 30 years as Podhoretz seems to think. We responded to Sept. 11 by launching two major wars in the space of 18 months. We launched those wars--or should have--with full knowledge that the power of our weapons and the nature of the enemy would cause civilian casualties even though civilians have not been targeted (they've been targeted by individual servicemen in a few instances but everything I know and have seen of the American military leads me to believe those are rare and isolated incidents). If the public is souring on the war I think that's because they're questioning the competence of the American political leadership and the practicality of our political aims in Iraq, not because they're unwilling to be ruthless.
In any case, it's pretty clear that we aren't seeking victory at all costs in Iraq. I don't think that's because our values restrain us from launching a total war. We aren't seeking victory at all costs in Iraq because that concept doesn't have much meaning here. I accept Podhoretz's assurance that he doesn't advocate terrorizing the entire country of Iraq into submission, but he says explicitly that such a policy might work. But work to do what? How does having all Iraqis trembling before American might advance American interests? How is a policy of simple intimidatation sustainable over the long-term, especially when our aim would be to intimidate, not just one country or a group of countries, but anyone in the world who might join a clandestine anti-American guerilla movement?
More importantly, when is it necessary to seek "victory at all costs"? How grave does the threat to American national interests have to be? How many Americans need to be at risk? It's beside the point to wring your hands and deal with abstractions about how our precious values may doom us in a fight against a ruthless enemy. Americans are like any other people—if they feel their lives or their way of life is seriously threatened they'll do just about anything to win. The real question is whether it's wise to approach every conflict with that kind of all-or-nothing mindset. There's a consensus
building that a softer touch—not the wholesale abandonment of liberal values—might have improved the American position in Iraq in 2003 and 2004.