My friend Chris apparently scandalized some people when he wrote, "To the south, along the curve of the coast, Hizbullah is launching Katyushas, but I’m loathe to say too much about them. The Party of God has a copy of every journalist’s passport, and they’ve already hassled a number of us and threatened one."

This has led to all sorts of nonsense about Hezbollah controlling reporters, reporters being propagandists for Hezbollah, etc.  Chris has a rejoinder to all that on his site and he's actually on the ground in Lebanon, so I defer to him on the specifics.  More generally, though, you have to be quite a starry-eyed innocent to believe that you can cover war without facing restrictions on what you see, what you hear and what you say.  Hezbollah is a militia with a history of kidnapping and killing civilians.  If it's anything like the Shiite militias I've seen in Baghdad it probably also has a lot of high school-aged foot-soldiers who are acting more or less on their own authority and would not get in too much trouble for shooting, harrassing or otherwise inconveniencing a reporter.

Reporters cover similar groups all the time.  In January, 2005, I was embedded in Mosul with the 25th Infantry Division.  I was reporting for Time and, for a lot of the embed, Tom Dworzak was with the same unit taking photos for the magazine.  For a few days we were in Tal Afar with Chris Hondros, who shoots for Getty Images (and to whom I owe a great debt—he took a pretty cool photo of me during a gun battle in Tal Afar).  Both of those guys are great photographers.  Take a look at their portfolios and really think about where they've been—Chechnya, Liberia, Angola, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, the West Bank, Kashmir.  They were both appreciative of the American military's embed program in Iraq.

Embedding has come under a lot of criticism from leftists on the grounds that it allows the US military to manipulate reporters.  Having embedded quite a bit I don't see it—if you're on the ground with a unit for several days they can't stage-manage what you see and what they say.  They could steer you towards units in particular places, I suppose, but I don't see that, either—with occasional exceptions you can pretty much get an embed anywhere you want, including the most violent and difficult parts of Iraq.  In any case, the point Dworzak made about embedding with the US military is that it's no different than "embedding" with a militia in Chechnya—if you run around with those guys, you either play by their rules or you leave (except that in Chechnya you might leave horizontally).

I think the right needs to be reminded of the same thing from the other side.  There's no moral comparision to be made between the US military and Hezbollah—Hezbollah targets civilians as a matter of policy and the United States military does not (that should go without saying, but I don't want to be misinterpreted).  But all fighting forces engaged in combat are going to be protective of information that might put their fighters in harms way.  If you want to embed with the US military in Iraq you have to sign an 11-page document that lays out the risks and the ground rules.  To give you an idea of why Hezbollah might keep western reporters away from its rocket sites, here's a section of the US military's embed ground rules:

(11)   The following categories of information are not releasable since their publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

a) For MNF-I / MNC-I or allied units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g. artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water, etc.) including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on-hand in support of combat units. (Unit size may be described as “company-size,” “multi-battalion,” “multi-division,” “naval task force,” and “carrier battle group.” Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as “large,” “small,” or “many.”)

b) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

c) Information, photography or imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces, or show the level of security at military installations or encampments should not be revealed. EXCEPTION: Locations may be described as follows: Stories written with Military units deployed in country will be datelined with that country’s name.  All Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as dateline and will state that the report is coming from “off the coast of,” etc

d) Unless a host-nation has publicly acknowledged that it is a participant or has otherwise authorized the release its identity, stories written in a specific country supporting the MNF-I / MNC-I will state that the report is coming from the geographic region.

e) Details of rules of engagement.

f) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

g) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives will not be disclosed. This includes unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by the appropriate COMBATANT COMMANDER.

h) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than “land” or “carrier based.” (Number and type of aircraft may be described in very general terms such as “large flight,” “many,” “few,” “fighters,” “fixed wing,” etc.

i) Information on intelligence collection activities including targets, methods and results.

j) Information on effectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures. 

k) Information on missing or downed aircraft or missing ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

l) Information on special operations units, unique operations methodology or tactics.

m) Specific operating methods and tactics, e.g., air angles of attack, and speeds; naval tactical or evasive maneuvers, etc.  General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

n) Information on effectiveness of enemy electronic warfare.

o) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against MNF-I/ MNC-I Forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific MNF-I/ MNC-I units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by the appropriate COMBATANT COMMANDER.  Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy." 

p) No photographs or other visual media showing an enemy prisoner of war or civilian internee's recognizable face, nametag or other identifying feature or item may be taken.

Finally, additional guidelines may be necessary to protect tactical security.

All of that seems perfectly reasonable to me, which is why I don't have any problems with the embed program in Iraq.  Obviously Hezbollah probably has reasons beyond operational security for restricting press access to certain locations.  That, again, would make Hezbollah like every other fighting force in the world.  Journalists are some of the best (worst?) navel-gazers in the world, and the Israeli-Arab conflict inspires a lot of passion among both well-informed and not-so-well-informed observers.  So when Chris writes a bit about the difficulties journalists face covering the story in Lebanon it inspires a lot of commentary from "media critics" (who may be reporters, bloggers, professional pundits or, God help us, professional press critics).  But before making a lot of sweeping judgments about the particular situation in Lebanon it's worth understanding the ways in which the situation there is the same as the situation anywhere else people are trying to kill each other.

 

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